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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 03-1069
                              
NAEEMGOLAM MOWLA; KISWARA PARVEEN MOWLA;
TAHASHANJIM MOWLA,
Petitioners
v.
John Ashcroft, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent
                              
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Nos. A72-784-760; A73-657-573; A73-664-914)
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 23, 2004
Before: ROTH, AMBRO, and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  April 12, 2004)
                             
OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Naeemgolam Mowla (“Mowla”), his spouse, and their son seek review of
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) summarily affirming the denial
    1In his initial application for asylum, Mowla listed only two incidents of alleged
persecution.  He subsequently obtained new counsel and submitted a supplemental
statement of facts, claiming that his first attorney did not permit him to review his
application before it was filed. 
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by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of their applications for asylum and witholding of
removal.  Because we conclude that the IJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, we deny their petition for review. 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
The Mowlas are natives and citizens of Bangladesh.  Mowla has submitted an
application for asylum on behalf of himself and his family, alleging that as a member of
the Jatiya Party he was the victim of political violence and reasonably fears persecution if
he is returned to Bangladesh.  He claims that he was targeted by the police and by
members of a rival political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). 
Mowla testified that he joined the Jatiya Party in the mid-1980s.  He served first as
a publicity secretary and later as the secretary of the Shanghadi youth organization.  His
duties included organizing party meetings and creating political posters. 
Mowla’s request for asylum is premised on four incidents, which occurred
between 1991 and 1993.1  First, he asserts that on September 15, 1991, he was attacked
by BNP supporters at a rally for the release from prison of the Jatiya Party President,
Hussain Mohammed Ershad.  He recounts that although the BNP supporters were the
aggressors, only Jatiya Party members—including Mowla—were arrested.  The police
3allegedly held him in jail for several days, beat him, and released him on the condition
that he withdraw from the Jatiya Party. 
Second, Mowla claims that members of the BNP bombed the annual meeting of
the Jatiya Party in Feburary 1992.  The BNP members allegedly distributed handbills
instructing Jatiya members to disband. 
Third, in October 1992, several individuals who Mowla claims were affiliated
with the BNP purportedly attacked him in his pharmacy.  They proceeded to destroy the
pharmacy and beat Mowla with sticks and swords, breaking his hand.  Although the
assailants accused him of conducting “illegal business and depriving [the] government
from the tax,” Mowla maintains that the attack was politically motivated.
Finally, Mowla asserts that, in April 1993, BNP members attacked him and four
of his friends in a restaurant.  Mowla’s finger was cut in the attack.  Although he
reported the incident to the police, the BNP members allegedly filed charges against him,
and the police subsequently sought to arrest him for instigating the altercation. 
Mowla testified that he feared he would continue to suffer harassment and
violence if he remained in Bangladesh.  He also sought to avoid arrest in connection with
the April 1993 attack.  He therefore left Bangladesh with his spouse and son on
November 23, 1993. 
The Mowlas entered the United States as visitors for pleasure authorized to stay
until May 22, 1994.  In September 1997 they were served with notice to appear before an
    2The Board had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b),
3.38, and 240.15.  On March 1, 2003, the Department of Justice reorganized Title 8 of the
Code of Federal Regulations to reflect the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security and its assumption of the functions previously exercised by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.  68 Fed. Reg. 10349, 2003 WL 724287 (March 5, 2003).  Under
the Homeland Security Act (“HSA”), the functions of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, including the immigration courts and the Board, remain within the
Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General.  HSA, 116 Stat. at
2273.  Regulations concerning the Board’s jurisdiction, previously designated at 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(b)(3), are now designated at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction under
section 242(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
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IJ for remaining in the United States without authorization.  The Mowlas, represented by
counsel, appeared before an IJ on four occasions.  In February 1998, they conceded
removability but applied for relief in the form of asylum or withholding of removal.  In
the alternative, they sought voluntary departure.  Mowla’s wife and son are derivative
applicants based on the incidents of persecution allegedly endured by Mowla. 
The IJ deemed Mowla’s testimony credible.  He explained: “The respondent’s
testimony has been consistent with the asylum application that he filed and the Court sees
no basis [for concluding] that the respondent lacks credibility for any reason.”  He
nonetheless denied the Mowlas’ applications for asylum and withholding of removal in
September 1998.  The Mowlas timely appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed the
IJ’s decision.  Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4) (now found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)),
the Board did not issue a separate decision.  The Mowlas timely filed this petition for
review.  INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).2
II. Discussion
5The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, permits us to consider “only . . . the
administrative record on which the order of removal is based” in evaluating an applicant’s
petition for review of a final order of removal; “administrative findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.”  INA §§ 242(b)(4)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(4)(A)-(B).  In light of this
deferential standard, we deny the Mowlas’ petition for review. 
A. Overview of the statutory framework and standard of review
Section 208(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b), confers on the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to an alien who is a
“refugee.”  An individual qualifies as a refugee if he or she is “unable or unwilling” to
return to his or her country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).  
An applicant bears the burden of proving eligibility for asylum.  8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(a); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 2001).  In order to
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must satisfy three
requirements: (1) he or she has a fear of persecution in his or her native country, (2) there
is a reasonable possibility that he or she will be persecuted upon return to that country,
and (3) the applicant is unwilling to return to that country as a result of his or her fear.  8
    3The eligibility threshold for withholding of removal is even higher: the Attorney
General must determine that repatriation will more likely than not jeopardize the alien’s
life or freedom on account of one of the protected grounds.  INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3).  The applicant must therefore demonstrate a “clear probability” of
persecution.  Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1998).  Given this higher
standard, an applicant who does not qualify for asylum also will not qualify for
withholding of removal. 
6
C.F.R. 208.13(b)(2)(i).3  A finding that an applicant has suffered persecution in the past
results in a presumption that he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  8
C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1).  The Government then bears the burden of demonstrating either (1) a
fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-
founded fear of persecution, or (2) that the applicant could avoid future persecution by
“relocating” within his or her country.  8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1)(ii). 
Whether an applicant has demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution is a factual determination reviewed for substantial evidence.  Abdille,
242 F.3d at 483.  We will uphold the IJ’s finding on these issues if it is “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992).  We will reverse only if “the evidence not
only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.”  Id. at 480 n.1.  Adverse credibility
determinations are also reviewed for substantial evidence,  Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143
F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998), and we will uphold those findings unless “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
In this case, because the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision without issuing a
7separate opinion, we consider the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination.  See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(B)(ii); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002).
B.  The IJ’s decision 
We conclude that the IJ’s decision, which was affirmed by the Board, was
supported by substantial evidence.  The IJ found that the February 1992, October 1992,
and April 1993 incidents did not amount to persecution.  Mowla made a number of
concessions upon cross-examination that undermined his position with respect to these
attacks.  For example, he admitted that he did not see the individuals who allegedly
bombed the Jatiya Party meeting in February 1992.  Although he later claimed that
another member of the Jatiya Party identified the individuals as BNP members, the IJ
need not thereby have concluded that the incident qualified as persecution.  Similarly,
Mowla testified that of the “seven or eight” people who attacked him in his pharmacy, he
recognized only one (and subsequently learned the name of another).  Aside from that
individual’s ostensive membership in the BNP, Mowla offered no evidence that the
attack was politically motivated.  On the contrary, the assailants claimed to be targeting
Mowla for conducting illegal business and tax fraud.  Finally, Mowla merely “guess[ed]”
that his attackers in April 1993 were members of the BNP. 
On the whole, Mowla failed to buttress his testimony with documentation, despite
    4Mowla’s counsel sought a continuance based on his ongoing attempts to secure
supplemental medical records, subpoena court records from Bangladesh, and obtain
affidavits from various individuals.  The IJ denied the motion for a continuance on four
grounds: (1) Mowla’s descriptions of the supplemental material were vague and
unspecific, (2) the seven-month period during which he should have collected the
materials was already longer than usual, (3) the existing package of material contained
sufficient information, and (4) the motion was not timely presented. 
8
having received seven months to obtain the information,4 and he did not provide a
reasonable explanation for the absence of corroborating documents.  The IJ noted with
disfavor that the letter from the Jatiya Party on Mowla’s behalf, one of the few
supporting documents Mowla obtained, merely acknowledged his membership—it did
not mention the four alleged clashes with the BNP.  He deemed it “peculiar that the
respondent, who seems to have claimed to have been perhaps some type of officer of the
chapter, with only 101 members, could not even get a letter that confirmed anything more
than the general involvement he had with the party. . . . [A] clear lack of evidence harms
this case because it was respondent’s obligation to prove anything that he could to
corroborate his claim.”
Viewing Mowla’s testimony and the record as a whole, the IJ concluded that
Mowla had failed to establish that these three incidents qualified as persecution.  He
explained: “Although the court does find that respondent is credible, the Court first finds
that there is no evidence of past persecution.  Although the respondent is a person who
was at an annual meeting in 1992, and whose store was also looted that same year in
1992, the Court has no sufficient evidence to convince it of who it was that perpetrated
    5Even if these were incidents of persecution, the IJ could properly have denied
Mowla’s application for asylum on the basis of changed country conditions, as discussed
below. 
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the offenses or whether, in fact, they were perpetrated for any reason protected by the
Act.”  While the IJ might have determined that these incidents were in fact motivated by
Mowla’s affiliation with the Jatiya party and therefore constituted persecution on an
enumerated ground, the evidence did not compel that conclusion.5  
With respect to Mowla’s September 1991 arrest, the IJ noted conversely that
“[t]here certainly is a claim to past persecution.”  He nonetheless declined to grant
Mowla asylum because he found “a clear change in circumstances because respondent
remained in this country for another two years after that time before ever leaving.”  Id. 
Later in the opinion, he explained that his finding of changed country conditions was
based on a State Department report noting that “at the time respondent left Bangladesh
. . . the Jatiya Party [was] enjoying not only an ability to campaign for elected positions,
but . . . also already enjoyed some success at becoming a part of the ruling organization
for the country.”  He went on to clarify that “even if the respondent were persecuted in
the past, the Court finds the changed country conditions[,] as outlined in the Department
of State materials, defeat the reasonableness of the claim.”  In other words, while Mowla
may have suffered persecution in the course of protesting the imprisonment of the Jatiya
party leader, the subsequent release of Ershad and attainment by the Jatiya party of
substantial governmental representation constituted changed country conditions.  We
    6The record reveals a slight inconsistency on this matter.  The IJ’s conclusion that
circumstances changed because the Jatiya Party attained a leadership position in the
government after the September 1991 arrest finds ample support in the record, including
the 1998 State Department profile of Bangladesh.  It is inconsistent, however, with an
exchange between the IJ and Mowla at the hearing suggesting that the Jatiya Party was in
rule at the time of the September 1991 protest.  As the protest was convened specifically
to obtain Ershad’s release from prison, we assume that Mowla’s testimony to the contrary
reflects a misunderstanding. 
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find this logic compelling.6
The same reasoning underlies the IJ’s finding that Mowla failed to establish a
well-founded fear of future persecution.  The IJ cited a State Department report stating
that the Jatiya Party is now part of the governing coalition in Bangladesh.  In fact, he
noted, “President Ershad, who never legitimately enjoyed the position of president in the
first place, is now free and actually even is a member of parliament.”  Mowla was unable
to explain why, in light of political changes in Bangladesh, he would face persecution if
he returned.  He simply made unsubstantiated assertions that he would be subject to
continued violence.
Finally, we note that the Board’s summary affirmance of the IJ’s decision in this
case was constitutionally permissible and appropriate.  “Certainly, the BIA could have
articulated its reasons for affirming the IJ’s order, but just because it had the power to do
so[] does not mean the Constitution required it to exercise that power.”  Dia v. Ashcroft,
353 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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III. Conclusion
The IJ’s denial of the Mowlas’ applications for asylum and withholding of
removal, affirmed by the Board, was supported by substantial evidence.  Because the
Mowlas have failed to establish their eligibility for asylum, they have also failed to meet
the higher standard of eligibility for withholding of removal.  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  We therefore deny their petition for review.
